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spend extraordinary resources to store and maintain data that may be relevant in
potential litigation. In light of the inconsistent case law among the federal circuit
courts’ imposition of sanctions for a loss of electronically stored information
(hereinafter “ESI”), and in order to reduce the overwhelming economic burden
for prospective litigants in their efforts to over-preserve potentially relevant ESI
out of fear of sanctions, the new Rule 37(e) was adopted through the 2015
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective as
of December 1, 2015.1
This Article examines whether the new Rule 37(e) has successfully achieved
one of its primary goals, which is establishing a uniformity in federal case law
on imposition of sanctions for the loss of ESI.2 In particular, this Article limits
its examination to the courts’ imposition of the more severe sanctions available
under Rule 37(e)(2). In doing so, Part I introduces the new Rule 37(e), as well
as its intended goals, and Part II discusses the significantly inconsistent federal
case law that developed post-2015 amendments with respect to courts’
conclusions on whether to impose severe sanctions after applying the new Rule
37(e)(2). In particular, the lack of a consistent standard applied by the courts in
determination of spoliators’ “intent to deprive” under Rule 37(e)(2), and the
unclear role that the courts’ inherent authority plays in such determinations, are
discussed in detail through case analyses. Then, in Part III, the authors propose
establishing and consistently applying a clear, stringent “intent to deprive
culpability” standard, which requires a heightened showing of an intentional
action taken by the spoliator to destroy the relevant ESI, and supporting evidence
shedding light on the spoliator’s motivation to deprive another party of the use
of the evidence. This standard would promote uniformity in case law on
imposition of severe sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2). Part IV contains concluding
remarks.
I. THE NEW RULE 37(E), ADOPTED BY THE 2015 AMENDMENTS, AND ITS
INTENDED GOALS
“Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the
failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or
reasonably foreseeable litigation.”3 The purposes underlying spoliation
sanctions have been to “deter parties from engaging in spoliation, [to] place the
risk of an erroneous judgment on the party who wrongfully created the risk, and

1. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
2. Rep. to Standing Comm., Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 35 (May 2, 2014) (“Two goals
have inspired [new Rule 37(e)] work. One has been to establish greater uniformity in the ways in
which federal courts respond to a loss of ESI . . . . The other goal has been to relieve the pressures
that have led many potential litigants to engage in what they describe as massive and costly overpreservation.”).
3. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
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[to] restore the ‘prejudiced party to the same position [it] would have been in
absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the [spoliator] party.’”4
Before any court applies Rule 37(e), “Failure to Preserve Electronically
Stored Information,” the following must be satisfied: 1) the ESI “that should
have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost [2)]
because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and [3)] it cannot
be restored or replaced through additional discovery.”5 If all three elements are
satisfied, then the court may determine whether sanctions pursuant to Rule
37(e)(1) and/or 37(e)(2) apply.6 The Rule makes clear that sanctioning measures
should be “no greater than necessary[,]” and therefore, “only upon [a] finding
[of] intent to deprive” are the more severe sanctions—such as an adverse
inference that either the court or the jury may “presume the lost information was
unfavorable to the [spoliator] party” or dismissal of the case—allowed under
Rule 37(e)(2).7
Prior to the 2015 amendments, there was a split of authority among the circuit
courts on imposition of severe sanctions for spoliation. The Second Circuit
granted adverse inference jury instructions based on the spoliator’s negligence
or gross negligence, while others, such as the Tenth Circuit, required a bad faith
showing before granting adverse inference instructions.8 Therefore, the
amendments were intended to eliminate the circuit split and thereby promote
uniformity of case law among the federal courts.9 Another goal that the
amendments sought to achieve was to relieve the excessive burden on potential
litigants from over-preservation of documents and records out of fear of

4. Id. at 779 (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
6. Id. The following is the full text of the new Rule 37(e):
FAILURE TO PRESERVE ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION. If electronically
stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of
litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot
be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court:
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may order
measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of
the information’s use in the litigation may:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was
unfavorable to the party; or
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.
Id.
7. Id. at (e)(1)–(2).
8. Compare Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.
2002) with Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997).
9. Rep. to Standing Comm., Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 42 (May 2, 2014) (“A primary
purpose of [the proposed 37(e)(2)] is to eliminate the circuit split on when a court may give an
adverse inference jury instruction for the loss of ESI.”).
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spoliation sanctions.10 Clear interpretations of and consistent applications of the
new Rule 37(e) by the courts would enhance the predictability of case outcomes
and promote uniformity in resulting case law. Consequently, litigants and
potential parties may be able to have appropriate expectations regarding
sanctionable spoliation conduct, as well as their duties to preserve relevant ESI.
According to the Advisory Committee Notes (hereinafter “Committee
Notes”) on the new Rule 37(e), because the Rule “authorizes and specifies
measures a court may employ if information that should have been preserved is
lost,” the Rule “forecloses” courts’ “reliance on inherent authority or state law
to determine when certain measures should be used.”11 An intention to
“foreclose [courts’] reliance on inherent authority or state law[,]” and adhere
instead to the Rule in reaching their decisions to impose sanctions, is consistent
with the goal of promoting uniformity of case law on courts’ imposition of
sanctions for spoliation.12
However, some commentators have been critical of the weight that has been
given to the Committee Notes, as they are explanations to aid in interpretation
of the Rule(s), and not part of the text of the Rule(s). Therefore, some critics
have argued that the focus should be limited to the actual text of the Rule(s), as
only those have been authoritatively adopted and not the explanatory comments
on the Rule(s).13 It is further contended that because the text of Rule 37(e) does
not refer to courts’ inherent power or authority at all, it “may be invoked to fill
any remaining interstices where the statute or rule is not ‘up to the task,’” and
moreover, it “may be exercised even where it conflicts with a statute or rule, [if]
necessary to protect a core judicial function.”14 This contention is in direct
conflict with the Committee Notes on Rule 37(e).
Lastly, Rule 37(e)(2) aims to narrow the requisite level of culpability based
on which of the more severe sanctions, like adverse inferences, may be
granted.15 However, the problem is that the “intent to deprive” standard in Rule
37(e)(2) is ambiguous because there is no clear definition or explanation as to
what constitutes or satisfies such culpability. Additionally, many courts still rely
on findings of bad faith, and/or lack thereof, without any supporting reasons or
authority for this reliance, and despite the fact that bad faith does not appear
anywhere in the text of Rule 37.16 Furthermore, courts have not elaborated on

10. See supra note 2.
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 Amendment.
12. Id.
13. Hon. James C. Francis IV & Eric P. Mandel, Limits on Limiting Inherent Authority: Rule
37(e) and the Power to Sanction, 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 613, 644–45 (2016).
14. Id. at 643.
15. Rep. to Standing Comm., Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 42 (May 2, 2014) (“Subdivision
(e)(2) resolves the circuit split by permitting adverse inference instructions only on a finding that
the party ‘acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation.’
This intent requirement is akin to bad faith, but is defined even more precisely.”).
16. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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the significance of bad faith findings (or lack thereof) in determinations of the
spoliator’s intent to deprive another party of the use of the evidence in litigation.
Therefore, Part II will examine in detail the inconsistent case law established by
the federal courts in their application of Rule 37(e)(2).
II. THE INCONSISTENT FEDERAL CASE LAW ESTABLISHED THROUGH COURTS’
APPLICATION OF THE NEW RULE 37(E)(2)
A. The Lack of a Consistent Standard Applied by the Courts in a Finding of
“Intent to Deprive” Under Rule 37(e)(2)
An examination of case law produced by courts’ application of the new Rule
37(e) demonstrates that they have established neither a clear standard nor a
consistent way of determining the spoliators’ “intent to deprive” under Rule
37(e)(2). Commentators note that, while the culpability required under Rule
37(e)(2) is “akin to bad faith, but is defined even more precisely,”17 it remains
unclear whether a showing of recklessness is sufficient to satisfy this
requirement.18 For instance, within the state of New York alone, case law has
not revealed consistent direction on courts’ imposition of sanctions for spoliation
because courts have applied different standards to find the spoliator’s intent to
deprive another party of the use of the evidence.19 Some courts have adhered to
a relatively narrow standard that if a party had failed to take reasonable steps to
preserve relevant ESI despite its duty to do so, then the court would find that the
party had an intent to deprive another party of such ESI, either from direct or
circumstantial evidence.20 Applying this narrow standard, some courts have
held “a party’s conscious dereliction of a known duty to preserve electronic data
is both necessary and sufficient to find that the party ‘acted with the intent to
deprive another party of the information’s use.’”21 Similarly, courts have found
17. Rep. to Standing Comm., Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 42 (May 2, 2014) (“[A]dverse
inference instructions . . . historically have been based on a logical conclusion—when a party
destroys evidence for the purpose of preventing another party from using it in litigation, one
reasonably can infer that the evidence was unfavorable to the destroying party.”).
18. Robert Keeling, Sometimes, Old Rules Know Best: Returning to Common Law
Conceptions of the Duty to Preserve in the Digital Information Age, 67 CATH. U. L. REV. 67, 100–
01 (2018) (“In articulating this [intent to deprive] standard, the Advisory Committee believed the
requirement of ‘bad faith’ adopted in numerous circuits to be ‘too restrictive.’ The Committee also
rejected the Second Circuit’s position that ‘negligence’ or ‘gross negligence’ was enough for severe
sanctions. Between the two standards, the Advisory Committee’s notes leave some ambiguity as
to what will count as enough. For example, despite numerous comments questioning whether
recklessness would be sufficient under the rule, the Committee remained silent.”).
19. See, e.g., Ungar v. City of New York, 329 F.R.D. 8 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Moody v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 410 (W.D.N.Y. 2017); CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F.
Supp. 3d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Karsch v. Blink Health Ltd., No. 17-CV-3880 (VM) (BCM), 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106971 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 20, 2019); Hsueh v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., No.
15 Civ. 3401, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49568, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017).
20. Ungar v. City of New York, 329 F.R.D. 8, 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
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it irrelevant “[w]hether the spoliator affirmatively destroy[ed] the data or
passively allow[ed] it to be lost” in determining whether the spoliator had an
intent to deprive under Rule 37(e)(2).22 The court applied this narrow and
specific culpability standard in Moody v. CSX Transportation, Inc., where the
defendant knew of the duty to preserve relevant ESI and still allowed “the
original data on the event recorder to be overwritten, and destroyed or recycled
[the crashed] laptop” that likely contained relevant information.23 The court
inferred that defendants had an intent to deprive because, in the period of four
years, they failed to confirm whether “the data had been preserved in another
repository.”24 This holding overreaches because, while one party acting
unreasonably generally amounts to negligence or gross negligence, the Moody
court inferred from the defendants’ unreasonableness an intent to deprive
another party of the use of the evidence; consequently, the court held that an

22. Id. See also Moody v. CSX Transp., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 410, 428–29 (W.D.N.Y. 2017)
(“[D]efendants allowed the original data on the event recorder to be overwritten and destroyed
without ensuring that it had been appropriately preserved. Just as it would be unreasonable for a
party preserving a paper file to copy it blindly, put it in a drawer without ever looking at it, and
then destroy the original, so too was it unreasonable for defendants to upload the event recorder
data to the Vault and not even look at the files to confirm that the appropriate data had been
uploaded and was accessible. This failure is especially remarkable in view of the important and
irreplaceable nature of the data at issue.”). As a result, the court found an intent to deprive pursuant
to Rule 37(e)(2). Id. at 429.
23. Moody, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 422–23, 431.
24. Id. at 431. The Moody court, in reaching its conclusion that an adverse inference was
proper, cited to Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. v. Boeing Co., in which a northern Alabama
district court said that the spoliator party’s “unexplained, blatantly irresponsible behavior [led] the
court to conclude that [the defendant] acted with the intent to deprive [another party] of the use of
[the evidence].” Id.; Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., 319 F.R.D. 730, 746 (N.D. Ala. 2017).
But in that case, the court inferred an intent to deprive from circumstantial evidence of bad faith of
the spoliator, noting that Rule 37(e)(2) intent to deprive is “harmonious with the ‘bad-faith’
standard previously established by the Eleventh Circuit” on spoliation. Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc.,
319 F.R.D. at 746 (citing Living Color Enters. Inc. v. Essent Healthcare, Inc., No. 14-cv-62216MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2016 U.S Dist. LEXIS, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 2010)). In particular, because
the ESI at issue had been intentionally destroyed by an affirmative act without credible justification,
which is a deviation from the standard protocol, the court considered this a “type of unexplained,
blatantly irresponsible behavior” and held that it was sufficient to conclude an intent to deprive the
other party from using such information. Id. In addition, and of critical importance, there had been
an agreement between the parties to extract the proprietary information at issue and to deliver it to
the law department for proper preservation, but the spoliator party had violated this agreement by
deliberately deleting such information without just explanations. Id. Based on this, the plaintiff
alleged that the spoliator party used that proprietary information in revising its bid to reduce the
price by $15 million without justification for the reduction. Id. at 744. The court likely found bad
faith of the spoliator in Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. especially in light of this particular fact
and consequently concluded that an adverse inference jury instruction was proper. Id. at 446. In
other words, this analysis goes beyond the narrow standard of finding an intent to deprive based on
the party’s mere failure to take reasonable steps to preserve relevant ESI. However, the court in
Moody did not conduct an analysis reaching beyond the narrow standard. Moody, 271 F. Supp. 3d
at 431.
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adverse inference instruction was warranted under Rule 37(e)(2).25 But the
Committee Notes make clear that Rule 37(e)(2) rejects the issuance of adverse
inference instructions based on a finding of negligence or gross negligence by
explicitly rejecting cases such as Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge
Financial Corp.,26 decided by the Second Circuit.27 Thus, the court’s inference
of the intent to deprive another party of the evidence, based solely on the party’s
failure to reasonably preserve the relevant ESI, raises serious questions as to the
requirements needed in order to satisfy the “intent to deprive” culpability of Rule
37(e)(2). Where a court infers that the spoliator party had an intent to deprive
another party of the use of the evidence in litigation by “passively allow[ing the
ESI] to be lost” without an affirmative destruction of the relevant ESI,28 the
requisite state of mind of the spoliator appears to be closer to that of negligence,
or at most, gross negligence, which should fall significantly short of an “intent
to deprive” under Rule 37(e)(2).29
Similarly, in O’Berry v. Turner, which courts often cite to, a district court in
Georgia found that the defendants had acted with an intent to deprive the
plaintiffs of the ESI at issue based on what it determined was the defendants’
“irresponsible and shiftless behavior.”30 Consequently, the court issued a
mandatory adverse jury instruction.31 Because the particular facts of each case
are important when examining how courts have treated spoliators’ conduct, the
25. Moody, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 431.
26. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that “a party seeking an adverse inference instruction based on the destruction of [ESI]
must establish (1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at
the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed ‘with a culpable state of mind’; and
(3) that the destroyed evidence was ‘relevant’ to the party’s claim or defense such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.”) (quoting Byrnie v. Town of
Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 107–12 (2d Cir. 2001)).
27. See Rep. to Standing Comm., Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 39 (May 2, 2014).
28. Ungar v. City of New York, 329 F.R.D. 8, 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Whether the spoliator
affirmatively destroys the data, or passively allows it to be lost, is irrelevant; it is the spoliator’s
state of mind that logically supports the adverse inference.”).
29. The Committee Notes clearly state
that a party’s intentional loss or destruction of evidence to prevent its use in litigation
gives rise to a reasonable inference that the evidence was unfavorable to the party
responsible for loss or destruction of the evidence. Negligent or even grossly negligent
behavior does not logically support that inference. Information lost through negligence
may have been favorable to either party, including the party that lost it, and inferring that
it was unfavorable to that party may tip the balance at trial in ways the lost information
never would have. The better rule for the negligent or grossly negligent loss of
electronically stored information is to preserve a broad range of measures to cure
prejudice caused by its loss, but to limit the most severe measures to instances of
intentional loss or destruction.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
30. O’Berry v. Turner, 7:15-CV-00075-HL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55714, at *13 (M.D. Ga.
Apr. 27, 2016).
31. Id.
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following is a factual summary. In O’Berry, the defendant employee, who was
the former loss control manager of the defendant company, testified that
when an accident occurred, his job was to print copies of the driver’s
log and any information collected on PeopleNet . . . . These documents
were then kept in a manila folder, along with any additional documents
related to the incident. Printing the driver’s log and PeopleNet data
did not require [the employee] to download any documents to his
computer’s storage—this information was printed straight from a
website.32
He testified further that he was “not aware of any [company] policies that
govern the collection process or storage of these accident files—it was simply a
part of his job to print and store a single paper copy of these documents.”33
With this particular accident on June 21, 2013, involving defendant Turner,
the loss control manager printed Defendant Turner’s driver log and PeopleNet
data, placing it into a folder on his desk.34 It stayed there until he “receive[d]
additional documentation, including the accident report and any photographs
taken at the scene. After a period of time, the folder was moved to a cabinet in
his office, where it had been filed alongside manila folders documenting other
incidents.”35 When the loss control manager received the spoliation letter of
August 18, 2013, he “took no additional action to preserve . . . the
information.”36 In preparation for an office move in November 2013, the loss
control manager packed the contents of his office.37 He soon took medical leave
however, and the maintenance crew moved “the boxes containing the contents
of his office to his new office . . . .”38 After returning in January 2014, the loss
control manager “unloaded the boxes, placing the manila folders into filing
cabinets in his new office.”39 When, in January 2016, he “received a request for
the manila folder containing information about [Turner’s accident, he] became
aware that he no longer had the manila folder. He then contacted PeopleNet to
retrieve the lost information; however, PeopleNet had already deleted the
relevant data pursuant to their document retention policy.”40
The O’Berry court noted that “[a]t no point between August 2013 and January
2016 did [the loss control manager] receive any correspondence inquiring about
or requesting information regarding this [particular] accident.”41 While the loss
control manager testified that while “he had done everything in his power to
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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preserve the evidence [, he had] no explanation as to why the [relevant] manila
folder [was] missing.”42 The court applied Rule 37(e) to this case and held that
it was “simply irresponsible to print a single paper copy of the information which
one has a duty to preserve . . . . At the very least, [the loss control manager]
should have made additional efforts to ensure the preservation of these materials
once the spoliation letter was received on August 18, 2013.”43 Because the
defendant company “had no written policy on the proper procedure for
preserving information that may be relevant in foreseeable litigation, at least not
that [the loss control manager] was aware [of,]” the court held that the defendant
company had “failed to ensure that these documents were maintained while in
[its] sole possession.”44
The court also noted that no one from the defendant company or defense
counsel had contacted the loss control manager “about these documents or
requested copies of documents until January 2016, despite numerous requests”
from the plaintiff’s counsel.45 Consequently, the court held that, considering all
the facts, “the loss of the at-issue ESI was beyond the result of mere negligence.
Such “irresponsible and shiftless behavior” can only lead to one conclusion—
that [the defendant company] acted with the intent to deprive [the plaintiff] of
the use of [such] information at trial.”46 As a result, the court held that a
mandatory adverse inference jury instruction was warranted, charging “the jury
that it must presume that the lost information” had been unfavorable to the
defendants.47
Here, the O’Berry court’s finding of an intent to deprive seems to have been
overreaching. It is unreasonable to require the loss control manager to undertake
42. Id. at *7.
43. Id. at *12.
44. Id. at *13.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at *14. This holding of a mandatory adverse inference jury instruction appears to be
unnecessarily harsh given the facts, especially since the court’s conclusion of finding intent to
deprive may have been overreaching. While the decision to impose and choose appropriate
sanctions are properly within the court’s discretion, a permissive adverse inference jury instruction
may have been more fitting under the circumstances. See Borum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC, 332
F.R.D. 38, 48–49 (D.D.C. 2019) (distinguishing O’Berry because the defendant company’s rather
weak retention policy did not rise to the level of “irresponsible and shiftless behavior” that the
O’Berry court found). In declining to follow O’Berry, the Borum court held that—while it agreed
the defendant company had “significantly inadequate record-keeping practices” and noted that the
company “had some data restoration features in place for deleted e-mails, albeit with an
unreasonably short recovery period[,]” these practices “alone [did] not satisfy the stringent standard
[of the intent to deprive requirement] of Rule 37(e)(2).” Id. It should also be noted that in Borum,
the defendant company had been late in issuing a litigation hold as well—the plaintiff filed suit on
August 25, 2016, but the written litigation hold was not issued until May 30, 2018, so “[p]rior to
this date, employees could delete company emails with only a limited 25-day recovery window[.]”
Id. at 41, 46 (citations omitted). The court concluded that it was proper to treat these practices as
“unreasonable,” but that such practices fell short of manifesting an intent to deprive the other party
of information in litigation. Id. at 46, 49.

186

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70.2:1

additional steps to ensure that all relevant materials were still well-maintained
in their respective manila folders and cabinets during an office move and
absence from work.48 While the absence of an adequate document preservation
policy and the failure to contact the loss control manager for the ESI at issue,
especially despite opposing counsel’s numerous requests, may constitute
negligence—and perhaps even gross negligence—such actions do not
necessarily indicate that the defendants intended to deprive the other party of the
information. Additionally, the record indicated that the loss control manager
“contacted PeopleNet to retrieve the lost information” once he realized it was
missing.49 While the court made clear that it considered all the facts in
concluding that the defendants “acted with an intent to deprive the other party
of the information,” perhaps the fact that no one reached out to the loss control
manager regarding the information, especially in spite of numerous requests
from plaintiffs’ counsel, played a critical role in its conclusion.50 All other
actions, including the lack of additional efforts to ensure proper preservation of
relevant ESI, amount to “irresponsible and shiftless behavior,” which is
generally considered negligent or grossly negligent conduct—falling short of the
level of culpability required to satisfy Rule 37(e)(2).
Some courts in New York, as well as other states, have continued to rely on
finding(s) of whether the spoliator acted in bad faith in their determinations of
the spoliator(s)’ intent to deprive another party of the evidence, despite the fact
that the text of the Rule 37(e) does not require a bad-faith finding or even
mention bad faith.51 For instance, in Resnik v. Coulson, the court found that the
defendant’s conduct in “‘actively download[ing’ a] data-wiping software” on his
computer just one day after the seizure of his devices had been ordered was
intentional in the sense that it was a “purposeful attempt to destroy all evidence
. . . .”52 The court thus concluded that the defendant had acted with an “intent
to deprive” the plaintiff of use of the evidence in terms of Rule 37(e)(2).53 The
court, however, did not go into any further analysis regarding the level of

48. O’Berry, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55714, at *6.
49. Id. Even assuming the loss control manager took additional steps to preserve the
information at issue—such as taking the particular manila folder out of the cabinet and separating
it from all other accident reports—there is still no guarantee that it would have been better preserved
in the midst of both the office move and his medical leave. Nonetheless, failure to take additional
steps to preserve documents should amount to negligence or gross negligence at worst. Therefore,
especially since the loss control manager most likely dealt with multiple incidents over a period of
two to three years, the court’s limitation of adverse inferences to the responsible defendant
companies, and not against the other defendants, was reasonable. See id. at *14 (applying the
adverse jury instruction to specified companies and “not to the other [d]efendants involved in [the]
lawsuit”).
50. Id. at *6.
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
52. Resnik v. Coulson, No. 17-CV-676 (PKC) (SMG), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55199, at *11,
*35–36 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2019).
53. Id. at *35–36.
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culpability beyond the defendant’s affirmative and intentional destruction of
evidence, but instead found that the destruction had been done in bad faith.54 It
subsequently held that the defendant had acted “with the intent to deprive [the
plaintiff] of [the evidence’s] use in litigation[,]” warranting more severe
sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2).55
Finally, there has been yet another approach—which seems the most
appropriate—by which the court requires the existence of a more particular and
specific intent on behalf of the spoliator: “the intent to actually deprive another
party of the evidence.”56 Hence, a mere intention “to perform an act that
destroys [ESI]” is insufficient.57 Accordingly, the court in Karsch v. Blink
Health Ltd. rejected the defendants’ contention that the intent to deprive should
be inferred from the fact that the destruction of the server containing the relevant
ESI took place weeks after the demand letter, and instead held that, while
“Karsch failed to take reasonable steps to preserve [relevant] ESI” on the server,
the court could not conclude that “he did so for the specific purpose of gaining
an advantage in [the] litigation . . . .”58 Moreover, the court noted that the law
firm’s status itself, without more, did not necessarily lead the court to conclude
that its failure to preserve the ESI at issue was intentional in terms of Rule
37(e)(2).59 Consequently, the court held that the law firm’s “actual loss of the
[devices],” coupled with its efforts to cover-up—including its false
representations—demonstrated gross negligence but not a specific intent to
deprive.60 This court’s reasoning—and holding—is significantly different from
other federal courts in New York, discussed previously, which simply found an
intent to deprive under Rule 37(e)(2) based on the spoliator party’s failure to
uphold its duty to reasonably preserve relevant ESI.61
Therefore, while such a narrow standard can produce more consistent case
law, and a more specifically defined standard would not require the courts to
exercise discretion in their findings, it is an inappropriate standard for courts to
apply in finding an intent to deprive, given that severe sanctions may result.
Thus, additional factors need to be considered to determine a party’s negligence
or gross negligence in satisfying the intent to deprive under Rule 37(e)(2), and a
clear standard should be provided with sufficient details as to the necessary
54. Id. at *7, *25–30.
55. Id. at *19, *35.
56. Karsch v. Blink Health Ltd., No. 17-CV-3880 (VM) (BCM), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106971, at *59 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 20, 2019). Compare CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F.
Supp. 3d 488, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (drawing a reasonable inference that the plaintiffs “acted with
the intent to deprive” based only on the intentional spoliation of emails and circumstantial evidence
supporting the presumed benefit derived by manipulating the emails).
57. Karsch, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106971, at *59.
58. Id. at *60, *62.
59. Id. at *72.
60. Id.
61. Even case law developed within the same geographical district (i.e., S.D.N.Y.) does not
present a consistent line of reasoning or conclusions.
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elements. Consistent applications of clear standards by the courts would result
in more predictable and uniform case law.
B. The Courts’ Unclear and Inconsistent Reliance on Their Inherent Authority
to Sanction
While it may be appropriate and desirable for all courts to follow the
Committee Notes, and thereby foreclose their reliance on inherent power in
order to promote uniformity in case law as the court in Borum v. Brentwood
Village, LLC explicitly did,62 an examination of federal court cases across the
nation has not revealed such a coherent or uniform finding. Some courts still
rely on their inherent authority, concurrent with Rule 37(e), to sanction parties
for their spoliation of ESI, while other courts insist on finding the spoliators’ bad
faith before imposing sanctions, albeit without explicitly invoking their inherent
authority. All the while, at least one court has specifically rejected applying
Rule 37(e) when addressing the issue of sanctioning spoliation of ESI.63 The
following subsections examine some of the notable cases that fall into each of
these categories.
1. Cases in Which Courts have Applied Rule 37(e)(2) as Well as Their
Inherent Authority to Address the Issue of Imposition of Sanctions for
Spoliation of ESI
In CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., the court held that while the new Rule
37(e) applied regarding the plaintiffs’ intentional alteration of the emails at issue,
the court could still exercise its inherent authority to remedy spoliation under the
circumstances, even if the Rule did not apply.64 The court stated that “[a]
‘particularized showing of bad faith’ is necessary to justify exercising [the
court’s inherent power,]” and that “[s]poliation designed to deprive an adversary
of the use of evidence in litigation qualifies as bad faith conduct.”65 In holding
so, the court discounted the Committee Notes’ advice to “foreclose[] reliance on
inherent authority” when it analyzed the applicability of its inherent power after
62. Borum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC, 332 F.R.D. 38, 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2019) (considering
whether to impose sanctions under both the court’s inherent power and Rule 37(e) and concluding
that, because “the loss of electronic evidence stored on emails [fell] squarely within the scope of
Rule 37(e)[,]” it should apply the Rule rather than its inherent power in the case of an employee
who deleted her emails before leaving her employment about two months prior to the issuance of a
written litigation hold).
63. Hsueh v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., No. 15 Civ. 3401, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49568,
at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017).
64. CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 488, 497–501 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(“Thus, sanctions would be available under the court’s inherent authority even if Rule 37(e) did not
apply.”).
65. Id. at 501. While the court held that it was reasonable to infer from the intentional
spoliation of the emails that the intention was to manipulate the digital information for purposes of
this litigation, and thereby found that the prerequisites of Rule 37(e)(2) were satisfied, it decided
against imposing the more severe sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2). Id. at 502.
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the court had already found that the Rule was applicable, and each of the
threshold requirements of Rule 37(e) was satisfied.66 Additionally, in Yoe v.
Crescent Sock Co., a United States District Court in Tennessee relied on CAT3
for the proposition that “[s]anction[ing] authority for the loss of ESI may also
derive from other sections of Rule 37 and possibly from the inherent power of a
court.”67
2. Cases in Which Courts have Relied on Findings of Bad Faith in
Determining Spoliator’s “Intent to Deprive” Under Rule 37(e)(2) Without
Invoking Inherent Authority
As previously mentioned, in Resnik v. Coulson the court found that the
defendant, who actively downloaded a data-wiping software on his computer
just one day after the seizure of his devices was ordered, acted intentionally in
the sense of a “purposeful attempt to destroy all evidence . . . .”68 The court thus
concluded that the defendant acted with an intent to deprive the plaintiff of use
of the evidence under Rule 37(e)(2).69 The court, however, confined its analysis
of the defendant’s culpability to his willful, intentional act in destroying the
evidence to reach the conclusion that he acted with an intent to deprive the
plaintiffs of its use in litigation.70 At the same time, the court found that
spoliation by the defendant had been in bad faith, and therefore the more severe
sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2) were warranted.71
By the same token, other courts have relied on the lack of a spoliator’s bad
faith to decide against imposing sanctions available under Rule 37(e)(2). In
particular, in Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Stanton Carpet Corp., the court found that
there was no question that the emails at issue had been lost for purposes of Rule
37(e), and that, if they had been available, it “would be helpful in evaluating the
merits of the [p]arties’ positions.”72 While the court held that “the loss of emails
certainly [was] prejudicial” to the non-spoliator party, it “decline[d] to impose
sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2), because Stanton [had] not shown that Virtual
Studios acted in bad faith or with intent to deprive Stanton of the use of the

66. Id. at 497–98, 500 (“The emails are plainly ‘electronically stored information.’ There is
no dispute that the plaintiffs were obligated to preserve them in connection with this litigation. As
discussed above, information was ‘lost’ and cannot adequately be ‘restored or replaced.’ And the
plaintiffs’ manipulation of the email addresses is not consistent with taking ‘reasonable steps’ to
preserve the evidence.”).
67. Yoe v. Crescent Sock Co., No. 1:15-cv-3-SKL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187900, at *21
(E.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2017).
68. Resnik v. Coulson, No. 17-CV-676 (PKC) (SMG), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55199, at *11,
*21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2019).
69. Id. at *21, *27–30.
70. Id. at *11.
71. Id. at *14.
72. Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Stanton Carpet Corp., No. 4:15-CV-0070-HLM, 2016 U.S. LEXIS
195196, at *31 (N.D. Ga. Jun. 23, 2016).
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information in this litigation.”73 The court did not elaborate as to why it was
necessary to undertake a bad faith analysis to reach its conclusion, or articulate
the grounds for finding a violation of Rule 37(e)(2) with actions taken either in
bad faith or with an intent to deprive.74 The court provided that “Virtual Studios
could have taken greater care to preserve the information[,]” but such “evidence
[only] indicate[d] that Virtual Studios was negligent or careless.”75
Consequently, as negligence does not rise to the requisite culpability to warrant
severe sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2), the court declined to impose them.76
In addition, in Schmalz v. Village of North Riverside, the court noted that
further evidence was required to find an “intent to deprive” under Rule
37(e)(2)—in addition to the defendants’ testimony admitting that they had failed
to preserve the ESI at issue while possessing a duty to preserve—because the
testimony only rose to the culpability of gross negligence, which falls short of
an intent to deprive.77 This court also required a showing that spoliation was
done in bad faith.78 Nonetheless, the court was “disturbed that Defendants
admit[ed] to failing to take any steps to identify and preserve the text messages
in question despite having [had] a duty to preserve [them.]”79 Moreover, the
court found it more troublesome that one of the defendants was a lawyer, who
should have known about “the significance of a litigation hold letter.”80
Nevertheless, the court held that “absent additional evidence of deliberate
intent to deprive Plaintiff of the use of the text messages [the] Defendants’
behavior, while certainly constituting gross negligence, does not rise to the level
of bad faith.”81 After concluding that the plaintiff failed to “present[ ] sufficient
evidence to make a finding of willfulness or bad faith required to find intent,”
no adverse inference instruction pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2) was imposed.82 The
court distinguished other cases in which courts found that spoliators engaged in
bad faith.83 For instance, the court distinguished this situation from a
“defendant’s ‘double’ deletion of emails and ‘[instruction to] others to delete
emails[,]’” as well as from the conduct the O’Berry court considered
“irresponsible and shiftless.”84 The court further distinguished the defendants’
actions from a “deliberate deletion and destruction of evidence and lack of

73. Id. at *31–32.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *32.
76. Id. at *32–33.
77. Schmalz v. Vill. of N. Riverside, No. 13 C 8012, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216011, at *18
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2018).
78. Id. at *13.
79. Id. at *17–18.
80. Id. at *18.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *18–19.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 14–15. See also discussion supra Section II.A.
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candor concerning [such] actions [which] constitute[d] bad-faith litigation
conduct . . . .”85 The Schmalz court made it clear that without these extraordinary
measures, sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2) would not be imposed.86
As demonstrated, courts have inconsistently relied on their analyses of bad
faith of spoliators, or lack thereof, which have long been an integral part of
courts’ decisions to impose sanctions pursuant to their inherent authority.
However, these courts have not expressly invoked their inherent power—and
often have failed to provide reasons for its invocation—or properly discussed
the significance that such bad faith findings, or lack thereof, have on the courts’
ultimate conclusion in finding intent to deprive. Furthermore, some courts have
placed bad faith conduct on equal footing with “intent to deprive” conduct by
applying an either/or standard, making each seem independently sufficient and
seemingly interchangeable, without any supporting reasons or authority for
doing so.
3. An Odd Case in Which the Court Explicitly Rejected Application of Rule
37(e) and Instead Relied on its Inherent Power to Sanction the Spoliator’s
Intentional Destruction of ESI
In Hsueh v. New York State Department of Financial Services, a United States
District Court in New York held that an adverse inference instruction was
appropriate where the plaintiff “admitted at her deposition that she had recorded
a relevant conversation,” regarding the alleged sexual harassment “but had since
deleted it.”87 Here, however, the court explicitly rejected application of Rule
37(e), after accepting the defendant’s argument that “Rule 37(e) applies only to
situations where ‘a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve’ [the] ESI
[and] not to situations where, as here, a party intentionally deleted” the ESI at
issue.88 Furthermore, the court referred to the Committee Notes in commenting
that Rule 37 was amended “to address ‘the serious problems resulting from the
continued exponential growth in the volume of ESI as well as “excessive effort
and money” that litigants have had to expend to avoid potential sanctions for
failure to preserve ESI.’”89 The court ruled that such “considerations [were] not
applicable” because the issue was not that the plaintiff “had improper systems
in place to prevent the loss of the recording,” but rather that the recording itself
“no longer existed . . . because [the plaintiff] took specific action to delete it.”90
85. Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Carmicle, Nos. 0:14-CV-60629, 0:14-CV-61415, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25879, at *118 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2. 2016), aff’d, 846 F.3d 1167 (11th Cir. 2017). See
also Schmalz, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216011, at *14 (quoting Brown, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25879, at *118).
86. Schmalz, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216011, at *18.
87. Hsueh v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., No. 15 Civ. 3401, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49568,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017).
88. Id. at *11.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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After holding that Rule 37(e) was not applicable, the court relied on its
inherent power to impose spoliation sanctions.91 Based on the spoliator’s
inconsistent and unconvincing testimony as to why she deleted the relevant
recordings, the court found that the spoliator “acted in bad faith in deleting the
recording[,]” and thereby concluded that “[u]nder either Rule 37(e) and the
Court’s inherent authority, an adverse inference is the appropriate remedy in
light of the Court’s findings.”92 Such a conclusion seems to suggest that even if
the court had applied the Rule, an adverse inference would have been
appropriate; however, the purpose underlying the adoption of the new Rule 37(e)
was to foreclose courts’ reliance on their inherent authority.
In any event, the Hsueh court appears to have erred by rejecting application
of Rule 37(e), as it did not have to determine whether the spoliator had acted in
bad faith. In other words, the court’s decision appears to suggest that a
spoliator’s bad faith actions are sufficient to satisfy the “intent to deprive”
culpability under Rule 37(e)(2). Furthermore, this holding makes clear that the
spoliator’s deletion of the recordings would have been sanctionable under either
the inherent power of the court or Rule 37(e). But, if the court was certain that
Rule 37(e) should not apply to this case, then it should not have felt the need to
address its application in the relief section of its decision, after rejecting its
applicability in the prior discussion.93
As demonstrated, courts have inconsistently relied on inherent authority—
explicitly or implicitly—as well as findings of bad faith, or lack thereof, in
reaching conclusions on whether to impose sanctions for spoliation of relevant
ESI. While the adoption of Rule 37(e) was intended to achieve uniformity in
case law for the imposition of spoliation sanctions, courts have not only failed
to apply the Rule consistently, but at least one court has erroneously disregarded
the application of the Rule. Others have continued to rely on their inherent
powers, thereby thwarting the underlying purpose of Rule 37(e), which was to
foreclose reliance on inherent authority of the courts.94

91. Id. at *11–12.
92. Id. at *16 (elaborating that the plaintiff “acted in bad faith, and with an intent to deprive
[the defendant] of the use of the recording, in deleting it”).
93. Id. If the court was correct that Rule 37(e) is not applicable here, then it was right to rely
on its inherent authority and, therefore, to analyze whether the plaintiff acted in bad faith because
such a finding is necessary to sanction under inherent authority. That analysis itself should have
been sufficient for the court to grant an adverse inference against the plaintiff.
94. See supra Sections II.B.1–2.
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR ACHIEVING UNIFORMITY OF CASE LAW IN COURTS’
IMPOSITION OF SEVERE SANCTIONS FOR SPOLIATION OF ESI UNDER RULE
37(E)(2)
A. A Stringent “Intent to Deprive” Culpability Standard Must be Established
First and foremost, a standard clearly defining the “intent to deprive”
culpability required by Rule 37(e)(2) must be established in order to achieve
uniformity of case law in courts’ imposition of severe sanctions for ESI
spoliation. Without a clear standard identifying what constitutes intent to
deprive another party of the use of such evidence, courts will continue to treat
similar misconduct differently, issuing sanctions that may not necessarily fit the
misconduct or that undermine the underlying goals of sanctions.
The intent to deprive culpability standard of Rule 37(e)(2) must be a
heightened one that is difficult to satisfy: only upon a showing of intentional and
willing act by the spoliator to destroy the relevant ESI, in addition to other fact(s)
shedding light on the spoliator’s state of mind or motivation, should it be found
that the spoliator intended to deprive another party of the use of such evidence
at the time of the destruction. In the rare case in which direct evidence of the
spoliator’s state of mind at the time of spoliation is available—demonstrating
that the intention was to deprive another party from using such evidence in
litigation—additional factors shedding light on the spoliator’s intent would be
unnecessary. However, direct evidence manifesting one’s subjective intent is
not always readily available, and, therefore, courts often rely on circumstantial
evidence in order to infer whether the spoliator acted with such intent.
Additional facts that may shed light on the spoliator’s state of mind may
include, but certainly are not limited to, the following: facts showing the
spoliator’s “double deletion” of relevant ESI by destroying or deleting the
relevant ESI and then ordering and/or instructing others with access to the same
ESI to destroy it.95 “Double deletion” can also be accomplished by somehow
going a step further from the initial destruction—such as installing a certain
program or software, thereby manifesting a motive to destroy the ESI, and/or
having a selective data preservation system in place that evinces the kind of
deliberate behavior the sanctions are designed to prevent.96
95. See GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., No. CV-12-1318-LPS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93299, at *5, *25, *29 (D. Del. July 12, 2016). Double-deletion may also “mean [an] operator
hit[ting] the delete key both to move the email into the trash folder and then hit[ting] the delete key
on the same email once in the trash folder.” DVComm, LLC v. Hotwire Commc’n., LLC, No. CV14-5543, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13661, at *7 n.13 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2016).
96. See Resnik v. Coulson, 17-CV-676 (PKC) (SMG), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92159, at *40–
41 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2019) (“[D]efendent conceded before the state court that he was given advance
notice that the sheriff would be coming to seize his devises. . . . These facts support a strong
inference that defendant acted intentionally, and with urgency, when he employed data-wiping
software just one day after the seizure of his devices was ordered. Defendant, of course, offers no
evidence indicating that any wiping of data that occurred was innocent or merely negligent or
grossly negligent.”).
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For instance, in First Financial Security, Inc. v. Freedom Equity Group, LLC,
while the spoliator party argued that the deletion of pertinent text messages was
an “innocent mistake[ ],” the court disagreed and concluded that the spoliator
parties’ “agreement to avoid communicating electronically suggest[ed] a shared
intent to keep incriminating facts out of evidence.”97 This court did not
explicitly hold that such additional evidence, from which it inferred the shared
intent among the spoliator parties, was necessary for the court’s conclusion that
the spoliator parties acted with the intent to deprive another party of pertinent
evidence.98 But, in establishing the heightened standard to satisfy the intent to
deprive culpability, this sort of supporting evidence should be made explicitly
necessary—in addition to the spoliator’s willful, intentional destruction of
relevant ESI—before any court issues the severe sanctions available under Rule
37(e)(2).
In contrast, the court in Orchestrate HR, Inc. v. Trombetta declined to find an
intent to deprive of the spoliator who had deleted relevant emails because
according to the court, it was presented with “only equivocal evidence about [the
spoliator’s] state of mind at the time that he deleted the emails.”99 The court was
presented with the following evidence regarding the spoliator’s deletion of
relevant emails: the spoliator admitted in his deposition “that he deleted [the]
emails and he ‘may’ have done so to ‘cover his tracks[,]’”; however, in his latercreated declaration, he stated that he had deleted the emails “in the ordinary
course of business only,” and those emails that he had admittedly forwarded to
his personal email account were provided to the other party.100
Based on this conflicting evidence, which the court itself found “troubling,”
the court held that even with “equivocal testimony . . . [the plaintiffs] failed to
show that [the spoliator] destroyed any emails in bad faith or with the requisite
intent to deprive” the plaintiffs.101 While evidence established that the spoliator
“was aware of potential litigation at the time that he deleted the emails and that
he knew or should have known that emails on certain subjects . . . might be
relevant to the litigation,” the court found that the requisite intent was not
satisfied “[c]onsidering the totality of circumstances.”102
However, if the stringent intent to deprive standard had been established and
applied at the time of this court’s decision, the outcome under Rule 37(e)(2) may
have differed because the spoliator intentionally deleted the emails at issue,
despite his knowledge that there may be potential litigation and so the emails
may be of relevance. The “troubling” conflicting evidence regarding his state
97. First Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Freedom Equity Grp., LLC, No. 15-CV-1893-HRL, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 140087, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2016).
98. Id. at *10–12.
99. Orchestrate HR, Inc. v. Trombetta, 178 F. Supp. 3d 476, 493 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (emphasis
added).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 492–93.
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of mind at the time of spoliation may have been sufficient circumstantial
evidence—shedding light on his motivation to delete the emails—to support a
finding of the intent to deprive required under Rule 37(e)(2). As a result, the
court may have been willing to hold that the spoliator’s conflicting testimony
weighed in favor of a finding that he actually intended to deprive the plaintiffs
of the use of the destroyed evidence.
By requiring a showing of intent to actually deprive another party of the use
of relevant ESI, which is not necessarily satisfied by an intent to perform an act
that destroys the ESI, courts would properly reserve the more severe sanctions
for egregious conduct done with a state of mind beyond negligence or gross
negligence. Such a heightened standard, making it more difficult to satisfy the
culpability requirement under Rule 37(e)(2), is not only appropriate but
necessary because adverse inferences and/or dismissals of actions are
detrimental to the disputing parties, as allowing severe sanctions for
unreasonable preservation of relevant ESI in, for example, the instance where a
party passively allows destruction of relevant ESI, is unnecessarily harsh and
drifts away from the underlying goal of deterrence towards pure punishment.
Furthermore, although the Committee Notes are not rules themselves, they are
intended to help all involved parties interpret and apply the Rules. Thus, where
the Committee Notes explicitly reject allowing severe sanctions based on
negligence or gross negligence, this commentary should be taken seriously and
not dismissed merely because it is not integrated into the text of the Rules.
B. There Should be No Room for Bad Faith Findings or Inherent Authority of
Courts in Application of the Proposed Standard
As discussed above, even where courts have explicitly recognized that the
new Rule 37(e) is applicable under relevant circumstances, they have often
relied on findings of bad faith to reach their ultimate decision to impose
sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2), without any specific discussion or reasoning as
to which facts led to such conclusions.103 Other courts have analyzed the same
issue of imposition of sanctions for ESI spoliation based on findings of whether
the spoliator acted in bad faith or with intent to deprive, which leads to a
misconception that acting in bad faith and acting with intent to deprive are
interchangeable standards.104

103. See Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Carmicle, Nos. 0:14-CV-60629, 0:14-CV-61415, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25879, at *110–12 (S.D. Flo. Mar. 1, 2016), aff’d 846 F.3d 1167 (11th Cir. 2017).
104. Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing, Co., 319 F.R.D. 730, 744–47 (N.D. Ala. 2017)
(finding the intent to deprive required under Rule 37(e)(2) and holding that permissive adverse
inferences were warranted based on bad faith spoliation case law). While the Eleventh Circuit
spoliation elements overlap with those of Rule 37(e) to a certain degree, the court did not undergo
any analysis of Rule 37(e) prerequisites. Id. See also Orchestrate HR, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d at 490,
493 (stating that Rule 37(e) application was “just and practicable” under the circumstances, then
relying upon a finding of either bad faith or intent to deprive, together, as if applying an either/or
prong test and treating either as sufficient).

196

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70.2:1

However, the proposed heightened standard, requiring a showing of intent to
deprive, does not mean that a showing of bad faith is necessary or sufficient.
Courts should not feel any need to determine whether the spoliator acted in bad
faith or not because Rule 37(e) neither requires nor even mentions bad faith.
Bad faith findings have long been part of courts’ spoliation analyses because
courts have traditionally imposed sanctions pursuant to their inherent
authority—for which the existence of bad faith was a prerequisite. The Supreme
Court has held of a court’s inherent power, “certain implied powers must
necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution . . .
which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the
exercise of all others.”105 The Supreme Court also held that a federal court may
exercise its inherent power to sanction, even if existing procedural rules address
the same misconduct,106 a concept dissenting justices criticized heavily because
they reasoned that it exempts courts from relying on express sanctioning
provisions provided by Congress.107
While there is no binding authority forbidding courts from resorting to their
inherent power to sanction, courts should rely on the express sanctioning
provisions, where applicable, in an effort to enhance consistency and
predictability of resulting case law on ESI spoliation sanctions. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has also held that “[b]ecause inherent powers are shielded
from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and
discretion” to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the
judicial process.108 Particularly with respect to sanctioning ESI spoliation,
which Rule 37(e) was specifically adopted to address—and also taking into
consideration the Committee Notes’ statement that the underlying intention of
such adoption was to foreclose courts’ reliance on their inherent authority—
courts should, first and foremost, rely on Rule 37(e) in deciding whether to
impose sanctions. Consequently, courts should no longer resort to their inherent
authority to sanction whether such reliance is made explicit or implicit in their
decisions.109

105. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11
U.S. 32, 34 (1812)).
106. Id. at 50.
107. Id. at 61 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“With all respect, I submit the Court commits two
fundamental errors. First, it permits the exercise of inherent sanctioning powers without prior
recourse to controlling Rules and statutes . . . .”).
108. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764–65 (1980).
109. Because bad faith and inherent authority are not found anywhere in the text of Rule 37(e),
bad faith analysis should not be necessary or sufficient to answer the question of whether the
spoliator party had acted with “an intent to deprive another party of the [relevant ESI] in litigation.”
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2). Nevertheless, in a case where a court is compelled to analyze bad
faith in its discussion, it should make the reasons for such analysis abundantly clear, as well as the
nexus between its finding of bad faith (or lack thereof) and its ultimate finding of intent to deprive
under Rule 37(e)(2). By providing clear explanations as to the impact of the bad faith finding on
the ultimate imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2), any ambiguity as to the court’s reliance
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C. The Permissive Language of Rule 37(e), Allowing Discretionary Sanctions,
Should be Removed
A critical view of the new Rule 37(e) contends that it fails to resolve any
uncertainty among the district courts in sanctioning spoliation because the
“permissive nature” of Rule 37(e) undermines the original purpose of sanctions,
while increasing the unpredictability of courts’ decisions on imposition of
sanctions “because parties do not know when, if ever, an adverse inference
instruction will be imposed even after a finding” that the non-spoliator party
sufficiently demonstrated the requirements of Rule 37(e)(2).110 Critics argue
that because Rule 37(e) allows courts to exercise their discretion in its use of the
word “may,” rather than “must” or “shall,” the predictability of outcomes on the
question of actual imposition of sanctions remains uncertain.111
Furthermore, should a court decide that an adverse inference jury instruction
is the appropriate sanction, judges enjoy “substantial flexibility” in drafting the
actual language of the instruction.112 Thus, the charge to the jury may vary
significantly, depending on the circumstances, which may also lead to diverging
outcomes in different courts.113 Therefore, it is contended that merely permitting
imposition of sanctions, rather than mandating them under Rule 37(e), takes
away the authoritative sanctioning power that the Rule once had.114
Advocates of mandatory jury instructions have argued that “[b]ecause a
central purpose of an evidentiary rule is to provide guidance and consistency,
the [jury] instruction should be mandatory instead of discretionary” because the
optional nature of the Rule would thwart its effectiveness.115 If sanctions were
mandatory, they would be issued as long as the prerequisites were satisfied,
making the Rule more effective in deterring spoliation and establishing uniform
case law. Hence, it may be argued that even if courts adopted and consistently
applied the proposed standard of intent to deprive, and thereby treated similar

on bad faith would be reduced. As a result, the validity of sanctions following courts’ well-reasoned
conclusions would not be subject to questions.
110. Alexandra Marie Reynolds, Note, Spoliating the Adverse Inference Instruction: The
Impact of the 2015 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), 51 GA. L. REV. 917, 935
(2017).
111. See id. at 931 (“Judge Scheindlin went on to predict that if the rule only dictated that a
judge ‘may’ impose the permissive adverse inference instruction upon a showing of all requisite
elements, ‘the optional nature of the rule would gut its effectiveness.’”).
112. Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Natalie M. Orr, The Adverse Inference Instruction After
Revised Rule 37(e): An Evidence-Based Proposal, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1303 (2014).
113. See id. (“Even the permissive inference can take multiple forms, prompting one
commentator to opine that ‘nearly fifty shades of adverse inference instructions have emerged.’
Some courts inform the jury that spoliation has occurred but allow the jury to infer the likely
contents of the evidence and decide what weight to accord that inference. Others allow the jury to
determine whether spoliation has occurred in the first place.”).
114. Reynolds, supra note 111, at 942.
115. Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 113, at 1313.
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spoliation conduct similarly, the permissive nature of Rule 37(e) sanctions
would still produce inconsistent results.
However, courts enjoy substantial discretion in choosing the appropriate
remedy for spoliation, and sanctioning power is also properly within that
discretion.116 Courts are in the best position to exercise discretion to impose
severe sanctions—upon satisfying the proposed strict standard of Rule 37(e)(2)
because they have access to the evidence, and are able to make appropriate
judgments based on that evidence. Additionally, the Rule’s text clearly provides
for courts’ discretion in the imposition of sanctions by using the word “may,”
instead of “should” or “shall.”117 Unless and until the Rule is revised to
explicitly remove such discretion, courts’ discretionary conclusions should be
respected. As discussed above, courts’ consistent application of the proposed
heightened standard for the intent to deprive would result in more consistent and
uniform case law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although a primary goal underlying the adoption of the new Rule 37(e) in
2015 was to resolve the circuit split and promote uniformity of case law on ESI
spoliation sanctions, an examination of relevant case law under the new Rule
37(e) has revealed that courts treat similar spoliation conduct differently due to
the lack of a clear standard for finding the spoliator’s intent to deprive another
party of the use of the destroyed ESI at issue. Such inconsistency was
exacerbated by the courts’ inconsistent reliance on their inherent authority to
sanction based on a bad faith analysis.
This Article proposes establishing a clear and strict standard for courts across
the nation to apply in determining whether the spoliator acted with the intent to
deprive another party of the use of the relevant ESI under Rule 37(e)(2). Such
a standard requires demonstration of the spoliator’s willful, intentional act that
destroyed the relevant ESI in addition to supporting evidence that sheds light on
the spoliator’s actual state of mind and intent to deprive another party of the use
of the destroyed ESI in litigation. In courts’ determination of whether the nonspoliator sufficiently showed the spoliator’s intent under Rule 37(e)(2), based
on the proposed standard, neither courts’ inherent authority to sanction nor
findings of bad faith should have bearing. Once courts begin to exclusively
apply the proposed heightened standard for Rule 37(e)(2), and no longer rely on
their inherent authority or bad faith findings, the inconsistency in case law that
has resulted from courts’ reliance on inherent authority and bad faith analyses to
date will no longer result.

116. See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The
determination of an appropriate sanction for spoliation, if any, is confined to the sound discretion
of the trial judge and is assessed on a case-by-case basis.”) (citation omitted).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(e)(2).
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Because courts should exercise caution in the imposition of severe sanctions
under Rule 37(e)(2), such as adverse inference presumptions, it is reasonable
and proper to heighten the standard to satisfy the requisite level of culpability.
This would ensure that courts consistently impose severe sanctions only for
egregious spoliation conduct which warrants such sanctions. This is why courts
should no longer impose Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions for merely negligent or grossly
negligent destruction of ESI. Less severe measures to redress ESI spoliation,
resulting from a party’s mere failure to take reasonable steps to preserve the ESI,
should be imposed pursuant to Rule 37(e)(1). Only upon satisfaction of the
proposed stringent culpability standard should the severe sanctions under Rule
37(e)(2) be granted. Furthermore, despite the discretionary nature of sanctions,
due to the permissive language in Rule 37(e), as courts begin to consistently
apply the proposed stringent culpability standard for severe sanctions, the
resulting decisions will be far more consistent—and, therefore, significantly
closer to achieving uniformity in case law on ESI spoliation sanctions.
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